“The self” is one of the most challenging and interesting issues in philosophy of mind and Cognitive Science. We all have a phenomenal conscious feeling that our experiences are unified into one identity – a self; that our experiences belong to someone. However what this self actually is or whether it actually exists is open to debate.
Such an issue has been debated for hundreds of years, long before modern science. Descartes (Meditations on first philosophy 1641) claimed that the self was the most clear and distinct thing known, in his famous statement “Cogito ego sum”. Hume on the other hand claimed the self was nothing more than a bundle of linked perceptions (A Treatise of Human Nature 1739).
More recently the philosopher Daniel Dennett has followed from Hume’s intuitions by claiming that the self is a theorist fiction. He claims it is a mistake to look for selves in the brain or mind. He makes analogy to a storytelling type writing machine – “Gilbert” that tells the story of a robot exploring a room. The narrative of the typewriter and the movement of the robot are very coherent but there is no self. By analogy we are centres of narrative gravity. We are all confabulators of our own stories independent of any realist truth. The self has no privileged place, it is an abstracta that allows us to understand and explain our actions.
What I want to focus on in this blog is Thomas Metzinger’s account of the self, which he addresses in his book “Being No-one”. He claims that there is not enough conceptual clarity of the self and hopes to build a multileveled constrained notion of the self called “the self model theory of subjectivity”. Such a theory eventually leads to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a self.
He distinguishes between minimal and maximal notions of self. Minimal defines the boundaries of a system and its environment with a dynamic generation of coherent actions (3 constraints). Maximal defines a more extended notion of the self with an autobiographical memory (further 7 constraints). These constraints form a very long account, so I will focus on the three constraints for minimal self; globality, presentationality and transparency.
- Globality – The idea here is that the contents of consciousness are what are being currently used by the system for functional and behavioural processes. This he draws from Global Work Space Theory (Baars 1988). One obvious problem here is that empirical studies show that unconscious states also function in behaviour and thus the contents of consciousness are not the only thing available for use. Nonetheless Metzinger maintains this constraint.
- Presentationality – Any system with a minimal notion of self will experience a constant flow of consciousness. It will have a feeling of being in the now and the outside world will appear unified. This seems very reasonable, but it can be pointed out that this constraint can only be tested on systems that can report their experiences, and thus other animals are rules out.
- Transparency – The contents of our phenomenal consciousness are represented by a vehicle in our brain to which we have no direct access to. We can’t see how things are being processed in our brains; such representational causes are left in the dark as it were. This gives any such system a form of naïve realism in which the system assumes its phenomenal perceptions and thoughts are the real self because they are the only things accessible
Following this Metzinger goes on to claim that any system generating a notion of self generates a phenomenal self model (PSM). Due to the transparency of our phenomenal consciousness we experience consciousness as a global whole that leads us to the belief that the self is whatever we subjectively experience from moment to moment. Metzinger’s point is that there is no-one in the strong sense having the experience. There is no Cartesian notion of a grand unified mental substance as Descartes proposed. The self is a simulated illusion; a virtual reality of an ongoing dynamic representational process.
Metzinger isn’t claiming that the self completely doesn’t exist and that we don’t experience a notion of the self, because clearly most of us do .What he is claiming is that that no such “things” as selves exist, in the way that “things” such as molecules and atoms do exist as realist entities. We just have access to a transparent phenomenal self model. Thus contrary to the way we experience the world; there is no unified Cartesian substance (or a soul) having these experiences.
Now this is a very hard concept for most to grasp but there are several real world examples that help clarify this abstract idea. These examples should help the reader see where Metzinger is coming from.
In terms of perceived body image, there are clear cases where a person can experience a distorted or complete lack of body image. Astronauts in weightless conditions for example, frequently claim they experience a complete lack of self body image. Similarly disassociative anaesthetics such as Ketamine can produce the experience of body image absence. The phenomenal experience of body image is caused by representations in the neural networks of the somatosenory cortex. If inputs into the networks are missing (as in the astronaut case) or connections within the networks are messed with then (as in the ketamine case) distorted body image follows. A further good example is that of phantom limbs. Patients with amputated limbs often report fully experiencing the feeling of a present limb where one does not exist. Again the case shows how the experience of the self can be an illusion.
When we look at the autobiographical notion of the self, the notion that our thoughts are linked and we have unified memories, other cases can show illusions as well. Patients of mania and schizophrenia show how this form of the self can be highly distorted. Mania induces experiences that the self goes beyond the limits of one’s body and mind. Patients report experiencing the world as an extension of their selves. Schizophrenics or people with split personality disorder report experiencing multiple selves. Clearly in these cases the boundaries of the autobiographical self are not clear cut.
One really interesting criticism of Metzinger’s account comes from Marcello Ghin, who argues that there are real patterns in the world that can be described as selves and thus Metzinger’s idea of abandoning the notion of the self is mistaken. While Metzinger claims that the subjective experience of the self emerges if a system operates under a transparent Phenomenal Self Model, Ghin adds the constraint that such a system must be self sustaining. He argues that the phenomenal experience of self must have had a self-sustaining function to have been selected in evolution. Thus phenomenal self modelling must help us regulate homodynamics, such as avoiding danger, seeking food, or gaining hierarchical status in a group. Thus the causal representational patterns of the PSM are real entities useful for scientific predictions and we should not abandon the notion of the self as a scientific concept.
As someone who believes that everything in reality can be understood as complex informational patterns, I see a lot of sense in where Ghin is coming from. Perhaps if we could find the neural correlates that cause the phenomenal experience of the self, we could conclude that we had found “the self”.
However the issue of embodiment raises problems here. Since every individual is embodied in a different context and therefore is formed from entirely different informational content, the patterns that form their unique self will consist of an entirely different pattern. Thus one could argue that any kind of universal theory would be impossible because the causal patterns of the self would be unique to the individual. None the less Ghin’s point does provide reason to believe in a realist notion of the self; just perhaps one that will never be able to be measured and predicted universally.
The issue of the self is huge topic and a whole volume of books could be written about it, so I’ll stop here. I may well pick up some of the issues in a latter blog. Until then I hope some of the points here can get the reader thinking on the issue.
10 comments:
I am not sure how derisive this attack on Metzinger's idea actually is. To say that there is a physical correlate to our phenomenal self is still to say that there is no self. I don't see this as much of an attack at all, and I don't think Metzinger does either, having read some of his responses to critics. Whether we conclude 'there is no self' has to do with a number of arbitrary philosphical definitions such as waht a self is, what existence constitutes, etc.
One thing that maybe should be stressed in your blog is that Metzinger tried to make a number of falsifiable predictions in his book, which was published about 2 years ago I think. I wonder if any of these tests have been performed?
One more thing Ive always wondered about: Metzinger tries to tie in representationalist, functionalist, and informational approaches in his book but his analysis to me seems characteristically representationalist, as most of his explanatory metaphores (on which explanations of consciousness and the 'self' often rely) make reference to representational structure in the brain. Is this an approach to cogntiive science which could be shown to be a bad way of thinking about the brain in the near future. That is, what assumptions about the brain is Metzinger making here in order to push his explanatory model?
Nice post though.
-Ev
Yes but maby the best we can hope to do is find the physical correlates. The phenomenal self may well be a virtual reality / illusion. But there may well be physical correlates that can be defined. Matzinger claims there is no such "thing" as the self. My understanding of this is that the self dosn't exist as an entity. However if we found the exact neural correlates for an individual that represented their PSM then wouldn't we have found a pattern of info we could call a self. Whether practically speaking this is possible is open to debate, but I think there is a good point to be made here. This becomes particular the case if one takes a monist view on mind and body i.e. that they are the same thing. it all comes down to the levels of analysis you are working at.
I havn't actually heard of these falsifiable predictions, so perhaps you could fill me in there.
In response to your last point, during our lectures last year on Metzinger, our lecturer tried to explain where each of the 11 constraints fitted into 'phenomenal', 'representational', 'functional', and 'neural' accounts. However I think he even had trouble properly knowing how it all fitted in and tied together, and we didn't overly go in to that much detail there.
However I do think these multi-leveled approaches are crucial in a well rounded understanding of consciousness (and I think its certainly a feature which most modern Cognitive Science theories are taking into account in their multidisplinary approaches). To purely focus on one level really restricts overall understanding. Each level relies on one another. 'Phenomenal' content is 'represented' by a 'neural' vehicle in the brain, which achieves a certain 'function'.
Thanks for you comment
Jack
Hmm, well I'm on board with metzinger. I think it doenst really make sense to say we have a 'self'. If you claim that the neural vehicle of our phenomenal self qualifies as a 'self', then you open yourself to some bizzare implications becuase you have just redefined the self into existence. For example, It would imply that the color 'red' really does exist, since there is a neural correlate of our experience of red. People like me and metzinger will shake our head and say "no, thats not at all what was once meant as 'red'".
it is true that it makes some sense to speak of a 'self' but only as a useful fiction. I think saying that I have a 'self' is going a bit overboard. There is certainly the idea of a self woven into a human conscious experience, and the physical brain is responsible for this - but like the color 'red', I would claimit does not exist any more than we would say a pink dragon exits if I am having the illusion of one.
Don't get me wrong, I don't believe in the strong notion of a phenomenal self either as an independent entity. But surely it can't be denied that it exists under a certain level of anlysis, namely a phenomenal one. furthermore it can't be denied that this is facilitated by a certain physical pattern of matter and this does objectively exist.
On another note, when you completely deny the existence of things such red, then you are effectively saying you are a philisophical zombie in my eyes. it clearly does exist on a phenomenal level, i.e. you do experience red. (Also your pink dragon exists on a phenomenal level. To deny that would be to say you didn't subjectively experience it.) There is no possibility of not experiencing red given a normally functioning visual system. Any physical system that meets such conditions will experience red upon light of the correct wavelength. I am a patternist. The correct patterns in reality always produce the same phenomenal result. (thats why I think machine consciousness is possible in principal).
Aside from qualia the self may be a different issue. I think its very possible to totally lose one's phenomenal notion of self, through psychedlic drugs or meditation, or through any of the examples I gave. The self is very much a virtual reality put forward by the brain to make sense of the world and to unify our experiences. I agree it dosn't exist as a cartesian substance. But under the correct conditions it does exist on a phenomenal level.
I don't know if you have read any David Chalmers, but I would be interested to know if you have which one of his ontologies you agree with (materialism A, B and C, type-D dualism, type-E epiphemenology, or type-F monism) I believe in a version of type-F monism, because I reason that any materialist account ignores the phenomenal level of anlysis and thus leads to philisophical zombies; plus any dualist account has huge problems addressing the epistemic gap.
Anyway let me know what you think!
If you mean to say " I would claimit [the self] does not exist any more than we would say a pink dragon exits if I am having the illusion of one." then we are on the same page. And I think thats what you are saying.
As for the catagorization of phenomenal experience, I do not have a very strong opinion in favor of any one due to a lack of empirical evidence. However I do haev strong opions against, say, Epiphenomenalism, since It seems to me to violate evolutionary theory, which is actually founded empirically. As for dualism, I think thats possible sure, if you mean that phenomenal experience is some extra type of 'stuff'.
Although I would not write off the materalist position as any more frivalous than, say, monism or dualism, since it seems quite possible that some sort of computational state could result in the 'belief' that you are conscious, for example - and logically there would never be any way of knowing. It sounds far out. But so does the idea that conscious experience is somehow 'the same thing' as a physical neural network firing. And of course so is the idea that conscious experience is some new sort of 'stuff'. I would say that monism and materialism are the most parsimonious explanations of the data.
I dont see how materialism necessarily 'ignores' the phenomenal level of experience. If I understand the issue correctly, materialists are just explaining the occurance of phenomenal experience in a different way.
So do you mean you are a non reductive physicalist?
Ill try to get those empirical 'predictions' from my notes one of these days. Metzinger is a very science-minded philosopher and made a few interesting ones.
yes I guese a non-redeuctionist physicalist isn't a bad way to put it. Although I prefer the term non-reductionist monist.
I see where your coming from on the physicalists explaining phenomenal experience in another way. i just find some of their accounts rather too hardcore and misleading.
I also highly agree with the evolutionary problems of epiphemenologism so I reject it as a viable account. its far too counter intuitive. The problem with any dualist account is that they never bridge the epistemic gap between the mental and physical. One can always ask further questions.
To be honest I find it hard to categorize my position. In some respects I take a dualist perspective (e.g. I believe in the phenomenal level of consciousnes which I think is best explained as a mental phenomena rather than a physical one in some respects) and in others a monist/physicalist (e.g. that in some sense all that phenomenal consciousness is is just a physical pattern.)
It all seems very paradoxical, but its the best I can do to avoid philisophical zombies and epistemic gap problems of dualism.
My self is reading others selves reasoning that self doesn't exist. How does this reasoning comport with the cognitive reasoning and philosophy of other selves explaining the void if in fact there is a void?
"My self is reading others selves reasoning that self doesn't exist."
Sorry a little unclear as to what you mean here. Could you re-phrase it?
and are u asking how this all fits into knowing the minds/selves of other beings. (I will write a blog on that at some point.)
anonymous: I dont think I understand you, but if you are asking how 'we' can argue that 'we dont exist', read Metzinger's book and you will see how this is possible.
Our brains integrate the transparent phenomenal self-model (PSM) along with normal conscious actions and thoughts (except for cases of disorders), which contributes to the experience of the first-person perspective. However the PMIR (phenomenal model of intentionality relation) is important as well in his Metzinger's model.
Therefore if I say "I dont exist", what is really occuring is this:
The thought "I dont exist" is being integrated into a PSM by the brain, thus giving rise to me experiencing the thought 'I dont exist' in the first person perspective. Since the PSM is transparent, the fact that the self is a mere representation will not be made apparent to the rest of the brain.
If your thought, on the other hand, is not integrated into the PSM as it normally would be, you will think God is talking to you.
Well, I don't know about you folks, but I'm sure that I am here. I may even be the only one here. lol
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